Volume 6, Number 2
August 2012
DISCUSSION

A Counterexample to Parfit’s Rule Consequentialism

Volume 6, Number 2, August 2012, Pages 1–11
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v6i2.149
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Abstract

Derek Parfit argues that everyone ought to follow the principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best. I present a counterexample: a world in which no one’s moral beliefs have any motivating force. I explain how Parfit’s metaethical commitments imply that such a world is possible, and why this possibility is a problem for Parfit’s project of reconciling Kantianism, contractualism, and consequentialism. I consider two of Parfit’s responses to my counterexample.
Copyright © 2012 Jacob Nebel
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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