Volume 10, Number 3
October 2016
DISCUSSION

Ability and Volitional Incapacity

and
Volume 10, Number 3, October 2016, Pages 1–8
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v10i3.185
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Abstract

The conditional analysis of ability faces familiar counterexamples involving cases of volitional incapacity. An interesting response to the problem of volitional incapacity is to try to explain away the responses elicited by such counterexamples by distinguishing between what we are able to do and what we are able to bring ourselves to do. We argue that this error-theoretic response fails. Either it succeeds in solving the problem of volitional incapacity at the cost of making the conditional analysis vulnerable to obvious counterexamples to its necessity. Or, it avoids the counterexamples to its necessity but fails to solve the problem of volitional incapacity.
Copyright © 2016 Nicholas Southwood and Pablo Gilabert
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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