Volume 30, Number 5
September 2025
ARTICLE

Reclamation and the Epistemic Objectionability of Slurs

Volume 30, Number 5, September 2025, Pages 697–721
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v30i5.4092
PDFPDF

Abstract

In reclamation, slurs are used in a positive way instead of the conventional derogatory way. This article discusses the idea that the meaning of slurs is not only morally but also epistemically objectionable and applies the idea to reclamation. The central claim of the proposed epistemic view is that reclamation can be seen as a way to challenge slurs as vehicles of harmful stereotypes. At the same time, the view explicates how reclamation is related to the notion of group self-definition.
Copyright © 2025 Pasi Valtonen
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
|

Non-Cognitivism and the Problem of Moral-Based Epistemic Reasons: A Sympathetic Reply to Cian Dorr

Joseph Long

Against Being For

James L. D. Brown

Sorting Out Solutions to the Now-What Problem

François Jaquet

Expressivism Worth the Name: A Reply to Teemu Toppinen

Jack Woods

Is Gibbard a Realist?

Laura Schroeter and François Schroeter

Unifying Moral and Epistemic Praiseworthiness

Leo Eisenbach

First-Person Authority over Gender: Metaphysical, Ethical, and Epistemic, but Nonabsolute

Fiona Woollard

Reframing Epistemic Partiality: A Case for Acceptance

Laura K. Soter

Gaslighting and Epistemic Competence

Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini

Murderers on the Ballot Paper: Bad Apples, Moral Compromise, and the Epistemic Value of Public Deliberation in Representative Democracies

Richard Beadon Williams

You Aren’t Really Black, You Aren’t Really White: Racial Denials and Epistemic Injustice in the Black-White Multiracial Community

Erica Preston-Roedder

Nonhuman Animals and Epistemic Injustice

Andrew Lopez

Portico