ARTICLE
Gratitude for What We Are Owed
Volume 29, Number 2, January 2025, Pages 249–282
Abstract
Many philosophers hold that we never owe others gratitude in return for their treating us in ways that we are owed. Instead, we owe others gratitude only for treating us in ways that go above and beyond the demands of morality. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken: we sometimes owe others gratitude for treating us in ways that we are owed. In particular, I argue that some moral duties require us to act in ways that express good will to one another, and when we act in accordance with these duties, we trigger duties of gratitude on the part of others.
Copyright © 2025 Aaron Eli Segal
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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