Volume 10, Number 3
October 2016
ARTICLE

Actualism Has Control Issues

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Volume 10, Number 3, October 2016, Pages 1–19
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v10i3.104
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Abstract

According to actualism, an agent ought to φ just in case what would happen if she were to φ is better than what would happen if she were to ~φ. We argue that actualism makes a morally irrelevant distinction between certain counterfactuals, given that an agent sometimes has the same kind of control over their truth-value. We then offer a substantive revision to actualism that avoids this morally irrelevant distinction by focusing on a certain kind of control that is available to an agent. Finally, we show how this revised view has two additional advantages over actualism.
Copyright © 2016 Yishai Cohen and Travis Timmerman
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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