DISCUSSION

How We Can Make Sense of Control-Based Intuitions for Limited Access Conceptions of the Right to Privacy

Volume 20, Number 3, November 2021, Pages 382–391
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v20i3.1438

Abstract

Over the years, several counterexamples arguably establish the limits of control-based conceptions of privacy and the right to privacy. Some of these counterexamples focus only on privacy, while the control-based conception of the right to privacy is rejected because of conceptual consistency between privacy and the right to privacy. Yet, these counterexamples do not deny the intuitions of control-based conceptions of the right to privacy. This raises the question whether conceptual consistency is more important than intuitions in determining the right way to conceptualize the right to privacy. This article aims to show how the major alternative to control-based conceptions of the right privacy—that is, limited access—can be modified to make sense of, and provide alternative explanations for, these control-based intuitions.
Copyright © 2021 Björn Lundgren
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