Volume 28, Number 1
July 2024
ARTICLE

Letting Animals Off the Hook

Volume 28, Number 1, July 2024, Pages 1–29
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v28i1.2800
PDFPDF

Abstract

A growing literature argues that animals can act for moral reasons without being responsible. I argue that the literature often fails to maintain a clear distinction between moral behavior and moral agency, and I formulate a dilemma: either animals are less moral or they are more responsible than the literature suggests. If animals can respond to moral reasons, they are responsible according to an influential view of moral responsibility—Quality of Will. But if they are responsible, as some argue, costly implications must be acknowledged. If, however, they should not be considered responsible, then we may have to reassess the meaning of animal morality. I discuss ways to eschew responsibility or to tailor it to animals and argue that each requires a revised conception of animal morality.
Copyright © 2024 Nicolas Delon
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
|

Culpable Ignorance and Mental Disorders

Dylan McChesney and Mathieu Doucet

Attributionist Group Agent Responsibility

Adam Piovarchy

Introduction to “Action and Production”

Pamela Hieronymi

Unifying Moral and Epistemic Praiseworthiness

Leo Eisenbach

Enclaves for the Excluded: A Pessimistic Defense

Jamie Draper

The Overweighted Integrity Problem: Conscience, Complicity, and Moral Standing

Kyle G. Fritz

Sulking into Sex: Blame, Coercion, and Consent

Sumeet Patwardhan

Addiction, Responsibility, and a Sorites Problem

Jeesoo Nam

The Point of Blaming ai Systems

Hannah Altehenger and Leonhard Menges

Dismissing Blame

Justin Snedegar

Alienation and the Metaphysics of Normativity: On the Quality of Our Relations with the World

Jack Samuel

Backsliding and Bad Faith: Aspiration, Disavowal, and (Residual) Practical Identities

Justin F. White

Portico