Volume 2, Number 1
July 2007
ARTICLE

Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice

Volume 2, Number 1, July 2007, Pages 1–19
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v2i1.19
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Abstract

In its standard formulation, luck-egalitarianism is false. Disadvantages that result from free choice to take a risk can constitute egalitarian injustice so long as that free choice is morally praiseworthy or at least neutral. A modified formulation of luck-egalitarianism avoids these problems. The formulation offered here focuses on the notion of innocence: lack of free and morally wrong choice to take a risk. Innocent disadvantage negates justice in both punitive and distributive contexts, suggesting that it may negate justice itself. The modified formulation of luck-egalitarianism may thus shed light on distributive justice and perhaps on the essence of justice itself; applying it to the punitive context can also illuminate some of the discussion of moral luck.
Copyright © 2007 Nir Eyal
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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