Volume 18, Number 3
September 2020
ARTICLE

Planning on a Prior Intention

Volume 18, Number 3, September 2020, Pages 229–265
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v18i3.850
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Abstract

Intention plays a central role in coordinating action. It does so, it is commonly thought, by allowing one to plan further actions for the future on the basis of the belief that it will be executed. Doxasticists about intention (Harman, Velleman) conclude from this that accounting for this role of intention requires accepting the thesis that intention involves belief. Conativists about intention (Bratman, Brunero, Mele) reject that conclusion. I argue that Doxasticists are right in calling attention to the existence of a cognitive aspect to intention-based coordination, but that such an aspect is better understood in terms of the attitude of reliance than of belief. I also argue that an appeal to reliance affords Conativists with useful resources for explaining that aspect of intention-based coordination in a way that is compatible with their rejection of the thesis that intention involves belief.
Copyright © 2020 Facundo M. Alonso
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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