Volume 29, Number 1
November 2024
ARTICLE

Kantian Free Riding

Volume 29, Number 1, November 2024, Pages 62–85
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v29i1.3449
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Abstract

Can Kantians distinguish unfair free riding from innocent coordination? If they cannot, the whole approach is flawed. This paper develops a novel solution. Free riders, as I will put it, fail to make their conduct conditional on other people’s preferences. They refuse to do their part regardless of what others prefer. It is not just that other people share the same preferences—as alternative accounts have it—but that the free rider does not care whether they do or do not share the same preferences. The same does not carry over to innocent coordination.
Copyright © 2024 Jan Willem Wieland
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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