What Is Wrong with Kamm's and Scanlon's Arguments Against Taurek

Tyler Doggett

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v3i3.36

Volume 3, Number 3
October 2009

ARTICLE

What Is Wrong with Kamm’s and Scanlon’s Arguments Against Taurek

Volume 3, Number 3, October 2009, Pages 1–16

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v3i3.36

PDF

Abstract

In forced choices between lives, where one group is larger than the other, Taurek claims you can save the few. Kamm and Scanlon argue that this is unfair. I argue it is fair. By Kamm’s and Scanlon’s own lights, it is fair. Kamm and Scanlon also try to explain why you are, in these forced choices, required to save the many. These attempts can be interpreted in three ways. I argue none works. By Kamm’s and Scanlon’s own lights, the most promising one does not work.

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