What Is the Bad-Difference View of Disability?

Thomas Crawley

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v21i3.1201

Volume 21, Number 3
March 2022

ARTICLE

What Is the Bad-Difference View of Disability?

Volume 21, Number 3, March 2022, Pages 422–451

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v21i3.1201

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Abstract

The Bad-Difference View (bdv) of disability says, roughly, that disability makes one worse off. The Mere-Difference View (mdv) of disability says, roughly, that it doesn’t. In recent work, Barnes—a mdv proponent—offers a detailed exposition of the mdv. No bdv proponent has done the same. While many thinkers make it clear that they endorse a bdv, they don’t carefully articulate their view. In this paper, I clarify the nature of the bdv. I argue that its best interpretation is probabilistic and comparative: it is the view that a person is likely to be, all things considered, worse off with a disability than without. As such, Barnes—who criticizes the version of the bdv that disability by itself, intrinsically or automatically makes a person worse off—misses an opportunity to attack the most plausible and relevant version of the bdv, and the best version remains unchallenged.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.

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