Attraction, Aversion, and Meaning in Life

Alisabeth Ayars

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v28i3.3068

Volume 28, Number 3
October 2024

ARTICLE

Attraction, Aversion, and Meaning in Life

Volume 28, Number 3, October 2024, Pages 386–410

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v28i3.3068

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Abstract

Desire comes in two kinds: attraction and aversion. But contemporary theories of desire have paid little attention to the distinction, and some philosophers doubt that it is psychologically real. I argue that one reason to think there is a difference between the attitudes, and to care about it, is that attractions and aversions contribute in radically different ways to our well-being. Attraction-motivated activity adds to the good life in a way that aversion-driven activity does not. I argue further that the value of attraction-motivated activity is irreducible to the prudential value of pleasure or desire-satisfaction. Rather, it contributes in a distinctive way to the felt meaningfulness of life. In the end, I offer a hypothesis: when we are attracted to something, we see it as (noncomparatively) good; and it is only when we pursue the apparent good that we see ourselves as engaged with the type of value that makes our lives and the universe worth maintaining.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.

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