A Hedonic Subjectivism

Daniel Pallies

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v30i7.4428

Volume 30, Number 7
December 2025

ARTICLE

A Hedonic Subjectivism

Volume 30, Number 7, December 2025, Pages 1100–1124

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v30i7.4428

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Abstract

In recent years, a number of philosophers of well-being have given more attention to the topic of ill-being. In particular, increasing attention has been paid to the distinction between two kinds of attitudes: those whose objects are good for us and those whose objects are bad for us. I argue that the difference between positive and negative attitudes should be explained in terms of pleasure and displeasure. If one takes pleasure in something, then the object of one’s pleasure is good for one. If one takes displeasure in something, then the object of one’s displeasure is bad for one. The resulting view is hedonic subjectivism. It is hedonic in the sense that it gives a central role to pleasure and displeasure in the theory of well-being; it is a form of subjectivism because it tells us that the objects of our pleasant and unpleasant attitudes are good or bad for us, respectively, in a way that goes beyond the goodness or badness of the pleasure and displeasure themselves.

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