Volume 28, Number 2
August 2024
DISCUSSION

More on the Hybrid Account of Harm

Volume 28, Number 2, August 2024, Pages 291–298
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v28i2.3426
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Abstract

According to the hybrid account of harm, an agent suffers harm if the agent has negative wellbeing or is worse off than before. However, Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, and Olle Risberg have criticized the hybrid account, arguing that it finds harm where there is none in cases of temporary benefits and that it fails to find harm in the case of death. In this note, I defend the hybrid account against both criticisms.
Copyright © 2024 Charlotte Franziska Unruh
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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