Volume 6, Number 2
August 2012
DISCUSSION

The Frege-Geach Objection to Expressivism: Structurally Answered

Volume 6, Number 2, August 2012, Pages 1–7
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v6i2.150
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Abstract

John Skorupski has argued that Mark Schroeder’s attempts to solve the Frege-Geach Problem in Being For fare as badly as the attempts of earlier expressivists. In this paper I argue that Skorupski’s objection fails. The objection ignores that on Schroeder’s semantics, the content of the being for attitude as it is expressed by declarative sentences in natural languages is restricted to relations to objects. The paper also briefly discusses to what extent that restriction is justified.
Copyright © 2012 Sebastian Köhler
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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