ARTICLE
Proxy Responsibility
Volume 31, Number 2, March 2026, Pages 147–172
PDFAbstract
Although proxy agency is a common social phenomenon (consider, e.g., a landlord selling property through a real estate agent or a jury delivering a verdict through a foreperson), the conditions under which principals and proxies can be held responsible for their participation in proxy actions remain underexplored in contemporary social philosophy. This article addresses this gap by offering a comprehensive account of proxy agency: it clarifies the elements that constitute proxy actions and examines the normative basis for attributing responsibility to principals and proxies for their contributions to the corresponding intentional collective acts. Building on this analysis, it proposes a general framework for proxy responsibility, grounded in the intentional participation that underpins both constitutive agency and authorship attribution. The article thereby provides a systematic conceptualization of the normative structure of proxy relations and their role in enabling key forms of institutional activity, particularly state and corporate actions.
Copyright © 2026 Miguel Garcia-Godinez
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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