Volume 20, Number 2
August 2021
ARTICLE

Defending the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility

Volume 20, Number 2, August 2021, Pages 168–187
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v20i2.1405
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Abstract

I consider three challenges to the traditional view according to which moral responsibility involves an epistemic condition in addition to a freedom condition. The first challenge holds that if a person performs an action A freely, then she thereby knows that she is doing A. The epistemic condition is thus built into the freedom condition. The second challenge contends that no epistemic condition is required for moral responsibility, since a person may be blameworthy for an action that she did not know was wrong. The third challenge invokes the quality of will view. On this view, a person is blameworthy for a wrong action just in case the action manifests a bad quality of will. The blameworthy person need not satisfy an additional epistemic condition. I will argue that contrary to appearances, none of these challenges succeeds. Hence, moral responsibility does require a non-superfluous epistemic condition.
Copyright © 2021 Martin Montminy
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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