Volume 26, Number 3
February 2024
ARTICLE

What Time Travel Teaches Us About Moral Responsibility

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Volume 26, Number 3, February 2024, Pages 523–546
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v26i3.1770
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Abstract

This paper explores what the metaphysics of time travel might teach us about moral responsibility. We take our cue from a recent paper by Yishai Cohen, who argues that if time travel is metaphysically possible, then one of the most influential theories of moral responsibility (i.e., Fischer and Ravizza’s) is false. We argue that Cohen’s argument is unsound but that Cohen’s argument can serve as a lens to bring reasons-responsive theories of moral responsibility into sharper focus, helping us to better understand actual-sequence theories of moral responsibility more generally and showing how actual-sequence theorists should respond to a recent criticism.
Copyright © 2024 Taylor W. Cyr and Neal A. Tognazzini
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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