Volume 29, Number 1
November 2024
ARTICLE

Should All Freedom Be Basic?

Volume 29, Number 1, November 2024, Pages 107–139
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v29i1.3128
PDFPDF

Abstract

Rawls has been criticized by political philosophers from more right-leaning perspectives. John Tomasi and Jessica Flanigan, for example, have argued that the logic internal to his high liberalism requires expanding the list of basic rights. Flanigan argues that nearly any freedom should be basic. Her argument has significant implications for the viability of high liberalism and its commitment to many aspects of the common good. I offer several novel responses on behalf of high liberalism. I argue that the most effective response to her argument will require that high liberals abandon the commitment to the lexical priority of liberty. As a consequence, the common good will end up playing a more prominent role within the high liberal paradigm.
Copyright © 2024 Seena Eftekhari
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
|

Republican Freedom and Liberal Neutrality

Lars J. K. Moen

Reciprocity and Liberal Legitimacy: Critical Comment on May

Blain Neufeld

Freedom of Gender

Rach Cosker-Rowland

Freedom, Desire, and Necessity: Autonomous Activity as Activity for Its Own Sake

Pascal L. Mowla Brixel

Freedom and Actual Interference

Jonah Goldwater

Is It Morally Permissible for Parents to Attempt to Convince Their Children of Their Comprehensive Views?

Sabine Hohl

Political Obligation and Political Recognition

Dan Khokhar

The Person as Environmentally Integrated: Dementia, Loss, and Extended Cognition

Matilda Carter

Allies Against Oppression: Intersectional Feminism, Critical Race Theory, and Rawlsian Liberalism

Marcus Arvan

Agnosticism and Pluralism About Justice

Adam Gjesdal

The Kids Aren’t Alright: Expanding the Role of the State in Parenting

Connor K. Kianpour

The Right to Emigrate: Exit and Equality in a World of States

Daniel Sharp

Portico