Volume 17, Number 2
April 2020
ARTICLE

Freedom and Actual Interference

Volume 17, Number 2, April 2020, Pages 133–158
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v17i2.660
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Abstract

Liberal and republican conceptions of freedom differ as to whether freedom consists in noninterference or non-domination. Pettit defends the republican non-domination conception on the grounds that one can be unfree without being interfered with if one is dominated, and that one can be interfered with yet free if not dominated. I show that these claims mistake the scope of actual interference. In particular, I show that cases said to involve unfreedom without interference do involve interference, and that cases said to involve freedom despite interference— in particular, cases involving government regulations—are cases in which some interference is outweighed by protection from even greater interference. The liberal noninterference conception of freedom, therefore, can account for what Pettit claims can only be accounted for by freedom as non-domination.
Copyright © 2020 Jonah Goldwater
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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