Interests, Wrongs, and the Injury Hypothesis

Richard  Healey

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i1.215

Volume 12, Number 1
September 2017

DISCUSSION

Interests, Wrongs, and the Injury Hypothesis

Volume 12, Number 1, September 2017, Pages 102–109

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i1.215

PDF

Abstract

I show that cases of harmless wronging only pose a problem for interest-based theories if we accept a significant assumption about the relationship between interests and wrongs.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.

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