DISCUSSION
Dietz on Group-Based Reasons
Volume 15, Number 3, August 2019, Pages 291–300
PDFAbstract
Suppose that groups have reasons to act. Do the members of a group “inherit” the group’s reason? Alexander Dietz has recently argued that they do so in some circumstances. Dietz considers two principles. The first one—which I call the “Simple Principle”—claims that the members of a group always inherit the group’s reason. The second one—which I call “Dietz’s Principle,” which is the one Dietz advocates—claims that the members of a group inherit the group’s reason when they cooperate. Although Dietz thinks that the Simple Principle is intuitively appealing he argues that it has to be rejected because it has—in contrast to his own principle—counterintuitive implications. In this article, I shall try to show that Dietz’s Principle also has counterintuitive implications. Furthermore, I shall consider some revisions of Dietz’s Principle, but conclude that they are unattractive. Finally, I shall suggest that Dietz’s Principle is ad hoc.
Copyright © 2019 Magnus Jedenheim Edling
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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