Volume 9, Number 1
May 2015
ARTICLE

Manipulation Arguments and the Moral Standing to Blame

Volume 9, Number 1, May 2015, Pages 1–21
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v9i1.87
PDFPDF

Abstract

The majority of recent work on the moral standing to blame (the idea that A may be unable to legitimately blame B despite B being blameworthy) has focused on blamers who themselves are blameworthy. This is unfortunate, for there is much to learn about the standing to blame once we consider a broader range of cases. Doing so reveals that challenged standing is more expansive than previously acknowledged, and accounts that have privileged the fact that the blamers are themselves morally culpable likely require revision. One such account figures in Patrick Todd’s argument for incompatibilism, which ostensibly depends on considerations involving the standing to blame. I believe this argument fails. But its failure is instructive, for it allows us to appreciate the numerous ways in which one’s blame can be morally problematic, and hence ways in which one’s standing to blame can be challenged. Thus, while one objective of this paper is to show why Todd’s argument fails, the larger aim is to use that argument to frame discussion of some important (and novel) ways in which the standing to blame can be compromised.
Copyright © 2015 Matt King
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
|

“The Government Beguiled Me”: The Entrapment Defense and the Problem of Private Entrapment

Gideon Yaffe

You Just Didn’t Care Enough: Quality of Will, Causation, and Blameworthiness for Actions, Omissions, and Outcomes

Mattias Gunnemyr and Caroline Torpe Touborg

Don’t Be Cruel: Building the Case for Luck in the Law

Alexander Sarch

Blaming for Unreasonableness: Accountability Without Ill Will

Alisabeth Ayars

The Overweighted Integrity Problem: Conscience, Complicity, and Moral Standing

Kyle G. Fritz

How Not to Defend Moral Blame

Andreas Leonhard Menges

Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism

Tristram McPherson

Unifying Moral and Epistemic Praiseworthiness

Leo Eisenbach

Being Wronged and Understanding Moral Wrongness

Daniel Vanello

When Enough Is Not Enough: Satisficing and Moral Efficiency

Konstantin Weber

Parents and Peers: A Kantian Moral Development

William Grant Ray

Soldiers and Moral Tragedy: Comments on Renzo

Christopher Kutz

Portico