Practical Knowledge and Foreseen Side Effects

Niels van Miltenburg

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v6i1.147

Volume 6, Number 1
March 2012

DISCUSSION

Practical Knowledge and Foreseen Side Effects

Volume 6, Number 1, March 2012, Pages 1–7

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v6i1.147

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Abstract

On Anscombe’s view, intentional actions are characterized by a specific type of knowledge (practical knowledge) possessed by the agents that perform them. Recently, interest in Anscombean action theory has been renewed. Sarah Paul argues that Anscombean action theory faces a serious problem: It fails to discriminate between an action’s intended aim or purpose and its foreseen side effects. Since Anscombeans conceive practical knowledge as the formal cause of intentional actions, Paul dubs this a problem of “deviant formal causation.” In this paper I will show that Anscombean action theory can escape Paul’s critique by employing a sufficiently developed conception of practical knowledge. It will turn out that Anscombeans can precisely capture the difference between intended aim and foreseen side effect in terms of differences in the agent’s knowledge.

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