Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons

Eric Sampson

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v9i3.179

Volume 9, Number 3
December 2015

DISCUSSION

Against Scanlon’s Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons

Volume 9, Number 3, December 2015, Pages 1–7

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v9i3.179

PDF

Abstract

We often say that one reason is stronger, or weightier, than another. These are metaphors. What does normative strength or weight really consist in? Scanlon offers a novel answer to this question. His answer appeals to counterfactuals of various kinds. I argue that appealing to counterfactuals leads to deep problems for his view.

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