Have We Reason to Do as Rationality Requires? A Comment on Raz

John Broome

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v1i1.13

Volume 1, Number 1
April 2005

SYMPOSIUM

Have We Reason to Do as Rationality Requires? A Comment on Raz

Volume 1, Number 1, April 2005, Pages 1–10

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v1i1.13

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Abstract

Three propositions: (1) Necessarily we have reason to do as rationality requires. (2) Rationality requires of us that, when we intend an end, we pursue that end. (3) Intending an end gives us reason to pursue that end. Joseph Raz argues by means of something he calls ‘the facilitating principle’ that 1 and 2 imply 3. He accepts 2 but denies 3 on the grounds that we cannot bootstrap into existence a reason to pursue an end, just by forming an intention. He therefore denies 1. I also accept 2 and deny 3 on the same grounds. But I am agnostic about 1. I argue that Raz’s inference of 3 from 1 and 2 is invalid, along with the facilitating principle.

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