Volume 1, Number 1
April 2005
SYMPOSIUM

Instrumental Rationality: A Reprise

Volume 1, Number 1, April 2005, Pages 1–20
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v1i1.14
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Abstract

The paper distinguishes between instrumental reasons and instrumental rationality. It argues that instrumental reasons are not reasons to take the means to our ends. It further argues that there is no distinct form of instrumental reasoning or of instrumental rationality. In part the argument proceeds through a sympathetic examination of suggestions made by Michael Bratman, John Broome, and R. Jay Wallace, though the accounts of instrumental rationality offered by the last two are criticised.
Copyright © 2005 Joseph Raz
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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