Volume 2, Number 3
November 2008
DISCUSSION

A New Theory of Humean Reasons? A Critical Note on Schroeder’s Hypotheticalism

Volume 2, Number 3, November 2008, Pages 1–6
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v2i3.119
PDFPDF

Abstract

I offer an objection to Mark Schroeder’s theory of reasons, what he calls Hypotheticalism. That view cannot identify plausible reasons for one to perform actions that directly satisfy one’s desires. If the only relevant desire is Ronnie’s desires to dance, for example, Schroder can identify reasons for Ronnie to do all sorts of things that promote his dancing—putting on some shoes, going to a party where there will be dancing, etc. But once Ronnie is on the dance floor Schroder cannot identify a plausible reason for Ronnie to dance.
Copyright © 2008 Matthew Bedke
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
|

The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality

Neil Sinhababu

The Goal Problem in the “Now What” Problem

Xinkan Zhao

Are All Normative Judgments Desire-Like?

Alex Gregory

Hume’s Internalism Reconsidered

Dale Dorsey

Instrumental Rationality: A Reprise

Joseph Raz

Have We Reason to Do as Rationality Requires? A Comment on Raz

John Broome

Comment on Raz

R. Jay Wallace

Instrumental Rationality: Not Dead Yet

David Sobel

Instrumental Mythology

Mark Schroeder

Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency

John Brunero

The Myth of Instrumental Rationality

Joseph Raz

Do We Have Reasons to Obey the Law?

Edmund Tweedy Flanigan

Portico