Volume 28, Number 3
October 2024
ARTICLE

On the Metaphysics of Relation-Response Properties; or, Why You Shouldn’t Collapse Response-Dependent Properties into Their Grounds

Volume 28, Number 3, October 2024, Pages 411–452
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v28i3.3270
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Abstract

Certain properties of great interest to philosophers—e.g., blameworthiness, praiseworthiness, desirability, etc.—appear on the basis of their standard English forms of designation to have relation-response structure. In other words, each such property appears on the basis of its standard English forms of designation to be a relational property of a certain sort, namely, the property of standing in a given relation to a given type of response. This presents a question: When we set out to theorize any such property, how seriously ought we to take the linguistic appearances? This paper defends an answer, namely: “Seriously.” In other words, we ought only to provide analyses of such properties that are faithful to their standard English forms of designation. This thesis is controversial: a number of philosophers of blameworthiness, for instance, seem to violate it outright, whereas other such philosophers—most notably, Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson and David Shoemaker—have argued that its violation follows from a popular combination of views about the natures of certain such properties. In the paper, I defend faithfulness against these latter arguments, and I endeavor to clarify the role that faithfulness plays (and ought to play) in recent debates about the natures of certain value properties.
Copyright © 2024 Spencer M. Smith
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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