Volume 31, Number 2
March 2026
ARTICLE

Grounding Human Rights in Political Conceptions

Volume 31, Number 2, March 2026, Pages 206–234
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v31i2.4338
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Abstract

In this article, I reinterpret political conceptions of human rights as grounding explanations, according to which facts about human rights practices ground facts about human rights. I first argue that this grounding interpretation of political conceptions clarifies their key claims and reveals how they are a genuine alternative to moral conceptions of human rights. I then develop a detailed grounding model of political conceptions to show how they can address some common objections, as well as to expose some previously overlooked gaps in their arguments. Finally, to close such gaps, I supplement political conceptions with an account of conceptual facts, which explains how human rights facts can be grounded in facts about practices without making political conceptions normatively unattractive. Taken together, these arguments seek to vindicate political conceptions as distinct and plausible accounts of human rights.
Copyright © 2026 Bosko Tripkovic
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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