Volume 19, Number 3
March 2021
DISCUSSION

An Occasionalist Response to Korman and Locke

Volume 19, Number 3, March 2021, Pages 311–323
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v19i3.1121
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Abstract

Dan Korman and Dustin Locke argue that non-naturalists are rationally committed to withhold moral belief. A main principle in their argument, which they call ec*, can be read in either of two ways, which I call ec*-narrow and ec*-wide. I show that ec*-narrow is implausible. Then I show that, if Korman and Locke rely on ec*-wide to critique non-naturalism, then the critique fails. I explain how the availability of a view that I like to call moral occasionalism can be used to respond on the non-naturalist’s behalf to the ec*-wide version of the argument. I also show how moral occasionalism is more useful for this purpose than an alternative third-factor account, namely David Enoch’s pre-established harmony view.
Copyright © 2021 David Killoren
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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