Volume 11, Number 3
May 2017
ARTICLE

The Motives for Moral Credit

Volume 11, Number 3, May 2017, Pages 1–30
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v11i3.113
PDFPDF

Abstract

To deserve credit for doing what is morally right, we must act from the right kinds of motives. Acting from the right kinds of motives involves responding both to the morally relevant reasons, by acting on these considerations, and to the morally relevant individuals, by being guided by appropriate attitudes of regard for them. Recent theories of the right kinds of motives have tended to prioritize responding to moral reasons. I develop a theory that instead prioritizes responding to individuals (through appropriate attitudes of regard for them) and argue that it better accounts for the basic features of the right kinds of motives—what we most fundamentally care about in judging whether persons deserve moral credit.
Copyright © 2017 Grant Rozeboom
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
|

Moral Worth in Gettier Cases

Neil Sinhababu

Moral Fetishism and a Third Desire for What’s Right

Nathan Robert Howard

There Are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal Anti-Positivism

Emad H. Atiq

Unifying Moral and Epistemic Praiseworthiness

Leo Eisenbach

Being Wronged and Understanding Moral Wrongness

Daniel Vanello

When Enough Is Not Enough: Satisficing and Moral Efficiency

Konstantin Weber

Parents and Peers: A Kantian Moral Development

William Grant Ray

Soldiers and Moral Tragedy: Comments on Renzo

Christopher Kutz

Moral Disagreement and the Question Under Discussion

Stina Björkholm

The Moral Harms of Homelessness

Bradley Hillier-Smith

It’s Only Natural! Moral Progress Through Denaturalization

Charlie Blunden

The Overweighted Integrity Problem: Conscience, Complicity, and Moral Standing

Kyle G. Fritz

Portico