ARTICLE

There Are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal Anti-Positivism

Volume 17, Number 1, March 2020, Pages 1–26
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v17i1.701

Abstract

Legal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: roughly, facts about what is morally optimific—morally best or morally justified or morally obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive view of the kinds of moral properties that ground legality results in a form of anti-positivism that can accommodate any legal rule consistent with positivism, including the alleged counter-examples. This form of “inclusive” anti-positivism is not just invulnerable to extensional challenges from the positivist. It is the only account that withstands extensional objections, while incorporating, on purely conceptual grounds, a large part of the content of morality into law.
Copyright © 2020 Emad H. Atiq
|

Grounding Human Rights in Political Conceptions

Bosko Tripkovic

On the Metaphysics of Relation-Response Properties; or, Why You Shouldn’t Collapse Response-Dependent Properties into Their Grounds

Spencer M. Smith

How Practices Make Principles and How Principles Make Rules

Mitchell N. Berman

The Motives for Moral Credit

Grant Rozeboom

On Emad Atiq’s Inclusive Anti-Positivism

Kara Woodbury-Smith

There Is No Institutional Duty to Vote

Jason Brennan and Christopher Freiman

What Is the Incoherence Objection to Legal Entrapment?

Daniel J. Hill, Stephen K. McLeod, and Attila Tanyi

Is There Value in Keeping a Promise? A Response to Joseph Raz

Crescente Molina

Can There Be Government House Reasons for Action?

Hille Paakkunainen

Colburn on Anti-Perfectionism and Autonomy

Thomas Porter