Volume 12, Number 2
November 2017
ARTICLE

Moral Uncertainty About Population Axiology

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Volume 12, Number 2, November 2017, Pages 135–167
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i2.223
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Abstract

Given the deep disagreement surrounding population axiology, one should remain uncertain about which theory is best. However, this uncertainty need not leave one neutral about which acts are better or worse. We show that, as the number of lives at stake grows, the Expected Moral Value approach to axiological uncertainty systematically pushes one toward choosing the option preferred by the Total View and critical-level views, even if one’s credence in those theories is low.
Copyright © 2017 Hilary Greaves and Toby Ord
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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