Volume 6, Number 3
December 2012
ARTICLE

Objective Morality, Subjective Morality and the Explanatory Question

Volume 6, Number 3, December 2012, Pages 1–25
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v6i3.65
PDFPDF

Abstract

A common presupposition in metaethical theory is that moral assessment comes in (at least) two flavors, one of which is sensitive to our epistemic circumstances, the second of which is not so sensitive. Though this thought is popular, a number of questions arise. In this paper, I limit my discussion to what I dub the “explanatory question”: how one might understand the construction of subjective moral assessment given an explanatorily prior objective assessment. I argue that a proper answer to this question is important not simply for its own sake, but because it also sheds new light on important challenges to the existence of both objective and subjective moral obligations.
Copyright © 2012 Dale Dorsey
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
|

I Might Be Fundamentally Mistaken

Michael Ridge

Cudworth and Normative Explanations

Mark Schroeder

On the Metaphysics of Relation-Response Properties; or, Why You Shouldn’t Collapse Response-Dependent Properties into Their Grounds

Spencer M. Smith

Alienation and the Metaphysics of Normativity: On the Quality of Our Relations with the World

Jack Samuel

Toward a Perceptual Solution to Epistemological Objections to Nonnaturalism

Preston Werner

Moral Vagueness and Epistemicism

John Hawthorne

The Goal Problem in the “Now What” Problem

Xinkan Zhao

Practical Commitment in Normative Discourse

Pekka Väyrynen

An Occasionalist Response to Korman and Locke

David Killoren

The Moral Closure Argument

Matt Lutz

What Normativity Cannot Be

Matthew S. Bedke

The Eligibility of Rule Utilitarianism

David Mokriski

Portico