Volume 3, Number 3
October 2009
DISCUSSION

Egalitarianism and the Value of Equality

Volume 3, Number 3, October 2009, Pages 1–7
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v3i3.129
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Abstract

Derek Parfit’s distinction between telic and deontic egalitarianism has stimulated a large amount of discussion concerning the value of equality. This paper argues that Derek Parfit’s distinction between telic and deontic egalitarianism does not capture many of the plausible alternatives to deontic and telic egalitarianism. I will argue that some responses to Parfit ignore the fact that the telic/deontic distinction incorporates two further distinctions between genesis and outcomes and between intrinsic and non-intrinsic valuations of equality. Although conditional egalitarianism maybe a plausible response to Parfit, neither the non-intrinsic nor the intrinsic versions of it put forward to date capture one of the most plausible ways to value equality. In particular, neither intrinsic nor non-intrinsic versions of egalitarianism sufficiently articulate the relation of being ‘part of’ another value. What I call ‘constitutive egalitarianism’ offers an alternative way of conceiving the value of equality and constitutes a plausible defence of the value of equality. Further, the conception put forward here is better able to capture the sense in which deontic conceptions, discussed for instance by Scanlon, value equality intrinsically.
Copyright © 2009 Jeremy Moss
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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