ARTICLE

Do We Have Reasons to Obey the Law?

Volume 17, Number 2, April 2020, Pages 159–197
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v17i2.742

Abstract

Instead of the question, ‘Do we have an obligation to obey the law?’ we should first ask the easier question, ‘Do we have reasons to obey the law?’ This paper offers a new account of the notion of what Hart called the content-independence of legal reasons in terms of the normative grounding relation. That account is then used to mount a defense of the claim that we do indeed have content-independent, genuinely normative reasons to obey the law (because it is the law), and that these reasons do sometimes amount to an obligation to so act.
Copyright © 2020 Edmund Tweedy Flanigan
|

Law and Violence

Alexander Guerrero

Dietz on Group-Based Reasons

Magnus Jedenheim Edling

In or Out? Benevolent Absolutisms in The Law of Peoples

Robert Huseby

A New Theory of Humean Reasons? A Critical Note on Schroeder’s Hypotheticalism

Matthew Bedke

Beyond Ought-Implies-Can: Impersonal Obligatoriness Implies Historical Contingency

Peter B. M. Vranas

What Relational Egalitarians Should (Not) Believe

Andreas Bengtson and Lauritz Aastrup Munch

Agnosticism and Pluralism About Justice

Adam Gjesdal

In Search of a Stable Consensus: Rawls’s Model of Public Reason and Its Critics

Cyril Hédoin

Coverage Shortfalls at the Library of Agency

Elijah Millgram

Agency, Stability, and Permeability in “Games”

Elisabeth Camp

The Stability of the Just Society: Why Fixed Point Theorems Are Beside the Point

Sean Ingham and David Wiens

Children, Partiality, and Equality

David O'Brien