Volume 29, Number 3
February 2025
DISCUSSION

There Is No Institutional Duty to Vote

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Volume 29, Number 3, February 2025, Pages 527–536
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v29i3.3869
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Abstract

Arguments for a duty to vote face the particularity problem—that is, they must show that voting in particular is the only way for citizens to achieve the relevant moral goal (e.g., promote the common good or avoid complicity in injustice), such that the goal cannot be achieved by activities other than voting. Kevin Elliott attempts to overcome the particularity problem by defending a universal duty to vote on the grounds that universal voter turnout is needed to ensure that democratic institutions function properly. We argue that Elliott’s attempt is unsuccessful. It is unable to explain why citizens may not promote turnout without voting; moreover, it does not establish that democratic institutions are morally special, such that citizens are obligated to contribute to them but not to other valuable institutions.
Copyright © 2025 Jason Brennan and Christopher Freiman
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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Portico