People Do Not Have a Duty to Avoid Voting Badly: Reply to Brennan

Marcus Arvan

doi:https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v5i1.138

Volume 5, Number 1
February 2011

DISCUSSION

People Do Not Have a Duty to Avoid Voting Badly: Reply to Brennan

Volume 5, Number 1, February 2011, Pages 1–6

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v5i1.138

PDF

Abstract

Jason Brennan argues that people are morally obligated not to vote badly, where voting badly is voting “without sufficient reason” for harmful or unjust policies or candidates. His argument is: (1) One has an obligation not to engage in collectively harmful activities when refraining from such activities does not impose significant personal costs. (2) Voting badly is to engage in a collectively harmful activity, while abstaining imposes low personal costs. (3) Therefore, one should not vote badly. This paper shows that Brennan never adequately clarifies 1 and that, on every plausible clarification, 2 is false.

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