Volume 9, Number 1
May 2015
DISCUSSION

The Moral Fixed Points: Reply to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau

Volume 9, Number 1, May 2015, Pages 1–6
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v9i1.167
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Copyright © 2015 Stephen Ingram
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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