Volume 13, Number 1
March 2018
DISCUSSION

Are Moral Error Theorists Intellectually Vicious?

Volume 13, Number 1, March 2018, Pages 80–89
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v13i1.228
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Abstract

Christos Kyriacou has recently proposed charging moral error theorists with intellectual vice. He does this in response to an objection that Ingram makes against the ‘moral fixed points view’ developed by Cuneo and Shafer-Landau. This brief paper shows that Kyriacou’s proposed vice-charge fails to vindicate the moral fixed points view. I argue that any attempt to make an epistemic vice-charge against error theorists will face major obstacles, and that it is highly unlikely that such a charge could receive the evidential support that it would need in order to play the dialectical role that Kyriacou has in mind for it. I conclude that the moral fixed points view remains in serious trouble.
Copyright © 2018 Stephen Ingram
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons

Rach Cosker-Rowland

Error Theory, Unbelievability, and the Normative Objection

Daniele Bruno

The Moral Fixed Points: Reply to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau

Stephen Ingram

Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge

Russ Shafer-Landau

The Goal Problem in the “Now What” Problem

Xinkan Zhao

An Occasionalist Response to Korman and Locke

David Killoren

Non-Naturalism and Reference

Jussi Suikkanen

Non-Analytical Naturalism and the Nature of Normative Thought: A Reply to Parfit

Nicholas Laskowski

Moral Vagueness and Epistemicism

John Hawthorne

Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to Ingram

Christos Kyriacou

A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Moral Theory

Mark Alfano

Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism

Tristram McPherson

Portico