Volume 16, Number 3
December 2019
DISCUSSION

Can Streumer Simply Avoid Supervenience?

Volume 16, Number 3, December 2019, Pages 259–267
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v16i3.508
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Abstract

In his defense of an error theory for normative judgments, Bart Streumer presents a new “reduction” argument against non-reductive normative realism. Streumer claims that unlike previous versions, his “simple moral theory” version of the argument does not rely on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive. But this is incorrect; without supervenience the argument does not succeed.
Copyright © 2019 Luke Elson
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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