DISCUSSION
Concept Formation in Ethical Theories: Dealing with Polar Predicates
Volume 4, Number 3, September 2010, Pages 1–9
PDFAbstract
In “A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Metaethics,” Mark Alfano concludes that the response-dependence theory of Prinz and others and the fitting-attitudes theory first articulated by Brentano are false because they imply empirically false statements. He further concludes that these statements cannot be avoided by revising the definitions of the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’ used in the two theories. I strengthen Alfano’s first conclusion by arguing that the two theories are false even if they imply empirically true but conceptually contingent statements, and show how, contrary to his second conclusion, the theories can avoid both empirically false and conceptually contingent implications.
Copyright © 2010 Sebastian Lutz
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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