Volume 17, Number 1
March 2020
ARTICLE

Humility and Ethical Development

Volume 17, Number 1, March 2020, Pages 48–74
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v17i1.732
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Abstract

Humility can seem like a somewhat “unfashionable” virtue: the word can conjure an image of cringing servility, unduly romanticized feelings of inferiority, or a level of self-denial which seems ill-placed in a life well-lived. But the term can also capture something of great ethical importance. In this paper, I will propose an account of humility that attempts to capture this moral significance. I will then explore the connection between humility and ethical development, seeking to argue that humility has an important role in ethical improvement. If such a connection is vindicated, it suggests that humility is valuable twice over: it has intrinsic worth but is also instrumentally valuable, enabling us to become better people.
Copyright © 2020 Cathy Mason
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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