Volume 10, Number 2
July 2016
ARTICLE

Liberalism or Immigration Restrictions, But Not Both

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Volume 10, Number 2, July 2016, Pages 1–23
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v10i2.99
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Abstract

This paper argues for a dilemma: you can accept liberalism or immigration restrictions, but not both. More specifically, the standard arguments for restricting freedom of movement apply equally to textbook liberal freedoms, such as freedom of speech, religion, occupation and reproductive choice. We begin with a sketch of liberalism’s core principles and an argument for why freedom of movement is plausibly on a par with other liberal freedoms. Next we argue that, if a state’s right to self-determination grounds a prima facie right to restrict immigration, then it also grounds a prima facie right to restrict freedom of speech, religion, sexual choice and more. We then suggest that the social costs associated with freedom of immigration are also costs associated with occupational choice, speech and reproduction. Thus, a state’s interest in reducing these costs gives it prima facie justification to restrict not only immigration but also other core liberal freedoms. Moreover, we rebut the objection that, even if the standard arguments for a prima facie right to restrict immigration also support a prima facie right to restrict liberal freedoms generally, there are differences that render immigration restrictions—but not restrictions on speech, religion, etc.—justified all things considered. In closing, we suggest that the theoretical price of supporting immigration restrictions—viz., compromising a commitment to liberal principles—is too steep to pay.
Copyright © 2016 Christopher Freiman and Javier Hidalgo
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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