Volume 20, Number 1
July 2021
ARTICLE

Friendship as a Non-Relative Virtue

Volume 20, Number 1, July 2021, Pages 30–55
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v20i1.1263
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Abstract

This article takes its bearings from Martha Nussbaum’s “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach.” There, Nussbaum proposes an analytic framework that is intended to allow those who disagree about the virtues, in particular due to cultural differences, to engage in fruitful dialogue with one another. To explore what such an approach might look like in practice, this article considers the case study of friendship. It critiques Aristotle’s account of that virtue and provides an alternative based on contemporary understandings. By placing these two accounts into conversation, the analysis demonstrates the promise of cross-cultural and cross-historical dialogue about the virtues.
Copyright © 2021 Rachel Friedman
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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