DISCUSSION

Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge

Volume 12, Number 3, December 2017, Pages 312–318
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i3.279

Abstract

It is widely agreed that normative properties supervene on natural properties. Non-naturalists face a distinctive challenge to explain this relation. Stephanie Leary argues that non-naturalists can meet this explanatory demand by positing the existence of hybrid normative properties. I argue that this proposal does not meet the supervenience challenge.
Copyright © 2017 David Faraci
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