Volume 7, Number 3
January 2014
DISCUSSION

Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes

Volume 7, Number 3, January 2014, Pages 1–9
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v7i3.154
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Abstract

Mark Schroeder has recently offered a solution to the problem of distinguishing between the so-called “right” and “wrong” kinds of reasons for attitudes like belief and admiration. Schroeder tries out two different strategies for making his solution work: the alethic strategy and the background-facts strategy. In this paper I argue that neither of Schroeder’s two strategies will do the trick. We are still left with the problem of distinguishing the right from the wrong kinds of reasons.
Copyright © 2014 Nathaniel Sharadin
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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