Volume 30, Number 1
March 2025
ARTICLE

What Makes Nepotism Wrong?

Volume 30, Number 1, March 2025, Pages 98–136
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v30i1.4326
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Abstract

Why is it wrong to distribute goods nepotistically, and is it always wrong to do so? In this paper, I examine three distinct objections to nepotism from efficiency, equality of opportunity, and wrongful discrimination. Though these accounts of the wrong of nepotism identify genuine concerns that help orient our thinking about nepotistic practices, I argue that they fail to provide a comprehensive explanandum of what makes nepotism wrong when it is wrong. As a corollary, I suggest that they are unable to account for the wrong-making features that different cases present and struggle to convincingly delineate between permissible and impermissible nepotistic activity. By way of a response to the challenges raised here, I emphasize the need for a distinct account and lay the groundwork for further normative work in this area by considering the morally significant interests that different cases present.
Copyright © 2025 Pascal L. Mowla Mowla
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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